This paper develops a simple game theoretical network model for social media (e.g., Twitter) as opposed to social networks (e.g., Facebook). In our directed model, connecting to other agents has a cost, and reaching other agents via (short) directed paths has a benefit; in effect, a user wants to have information diffused to them quickly from a specific set of agents, but without the cost of directly following each and every one.
INTRODUCTION
Twitter is often considered to be a social network, such as Facebook and the like. Both are social online platforms and both contain content curated solely from its users. However, the CEO of twitter has famously insisted that "Twitter is not a social network" [Per10] . Social networks (including Facebook, Google Plus, and LinkedIn) facilitate social connections [Eb13], while social media (which includes Twitter, Tumblr, and blogs) refer to "the many relatively inexpensive and widely accessible electronic tools that enable anyone to publish and access information" [Mur13] . While the two are not mutually exclusive, the latter has a primary focus on allowing users to publish news or updates, and is not restricted to real-world communities of friends. Indeed, social media networks are largely directed ; with information flowing in one direction, and not necessarily (or even often) in the other, while social networks are largely undirected, describing mutual relationships. Moreover, certain graph properties such as the clustering coefficient, which loosely measures the probability of a connection between A and B given that they are both connected to another user C, tend to be different across the two classes of networks.
While many network models exist, most are either stochastic (i.e., probabilistic models) or are learned models (i.e., constructed by fitting a set of parameters). Only a few game theoretic approaches exist, and none have been developed for the context of social media. We take a first step towards this goal by introducing a simple directed network model has three key parameters:
1. the cost c of directly connecting to (i.e., "following") another user, 2. the target sets T : v → P(V ) which determines the set of users v is interested in reaching, and 3. the distance k (i.e., the maximum path length) that suffices for indirectly connecting to another user.
This model allows us to define a natural multi-dimensional generalized clustering coefficient which relates to the stability of the network according to our game-theoretic model. We hypothesise that social media networks are fundamentally different than social networks with respect to this metric. We begin by formally introducing the model and clustering coefficient in Section 1.1. We then evaluate two realworld networks, subsets from Twitter and Google Plus, and measure their stability in this framework in Section 3. We find that there is a significant gap between the clustering coefficients on Twitter and GooglePlus across all dimensions, which confirms our hypothesis. We then approach the problem from a theoretical point of view in Section 4 for the special case of T (v) = V . We study the stability and efficiency of static networks and, in particular, construct efficient and symmetric-efficient networks. Furthermore, we consider a stochastic best-response dynamics, and prove that for k = ∞ the dynamics always convergence to an equilibrium, moreover the set of equilibria can be very complex.
Our Model
Let V be a set of agents, and let n = |V |. Each agent v ∈ V has a strategy Sv, which consists of any subset of agents Sv ⊆ V . Thinking of agents as vertices, Sv corresponds to the set of vertices that v connects to by building an edge vu. Thus, the strategy vector S = (S1, . . . , Sn) defines a directed graph G = (V, E) where E = {vu|u ∈ Sv}, and vice versa. With some abuse of notation, we often refer to G as the set of strategies and will use G and S interchangeably.
We let d + G (v) = |Sv| denote the number of outgoing edges of v, and let d − G (v) = |{uv|v ∈ Su}| denote the number of incoming edges to v. We say there is a path of length k from u to w if there exists a set of directed edges uv1, v1v2, . . . , v k w ∈ E; the diameter D(G) is the smallest k such that for all u, v ∈ V there exists a path of length at most k from u to v; if the graph is disconnected we say D(G) = ∞.
We let R k G (v) ⊆ V be the set of vertices that are reachable from v via a directed path starting at v of length at most k < n, and we let T (v) ⊆ V be the target set of vertex v, i.e., the set of vertices v would like to reach. We can then define the utility of a vertex v in a graph G as follows:
where c is the cost of maintaining an edge. In other words, vertex v's utility is given by a positive component, which is the benefit from reaching target vertices via short paths (of length at most k), and a negative component, which is the cost it requires to maintain outgoing edges. For convenience we often denote
Our model can be thought of as a generalization of the one in [BG00]; their model corresponds to ours with k = ∞ and T (v) = V for all v. Our model is, in turn, generalized by a novel model for bidirectional directed networks G = (V, Es, E ) (see Section A; our model is equivalent to the bidirectional model for cs = c, c = 0 and E = V × V .) 1 While we believe that our more general bidirectional model is of general interest, we use the model presented above for this work.
Our Contributions
We introduce a simple game theoretical network model for social media such as Twitter (Section 1.1). This model can be used to define a multi-dimensional metric that can be though of as a generalized clustering coefficient. We hypothesize that social media networks are fundamentally different from social networks according to this metric. We evaluate two real-world networks; a subset of the social media site Twitter, and a subset of the GooglePlus social network, and find that our hypothesis is confirmed (Section 3.3).
1 The bidirectional model captures networks where links are directed but require consent from the incoming endpoint; e.g., Twitter private accounts.
We then work towards understanding the model from a theoretical standpoint. We prove that a stochastic asynchronous version of best-response dynamics where one edge is updated at a time will converge to a stable network (Section 4.2). Moreover, these natural dynamics have a large class of complex networks as possible convergence points.
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We further study the stability and efficiency properties of static networks (Section 4.3). We give efficient networks for a wide range of parameters and show that they these networks are also stable. We then consider symmetric networks (where every node has the same utility) and give asymptotically symmetric-efficient networks, which are, however, unstable. We leave open the technically challenging question of whether symmetric networks that are also stable exist.
RELATED WORK
There is a wide literature on networks and their social and economic properties (see [EK10] ). In particular, many (1-dimensional) measures of clustering have been defined [LP49, WS98, OP09, Ops13] . These clustering coefficients capture statistics about local connections; i.e., vertices that are apart by at most two edges. Our k-dimensional clustering coefficient generalizes these approaches by considering clustering between vertices that are at most k + 1 edges apart.
Due to the vast range of applications; from sociology to commerce, biology and physics, with drastically different underlying properties, many models have been developed and studied in depth (see [New03] for a survey). Starting with G(n, p) [ER60, Bol01], stochastic models have often taken a forefront. Depending on the observed graph properties, different models take the forefront, such as preferential attachment models [BA99] for specific degree distributions, or small-worlds models [WS98] for capturing social networks. An alternate approach, is to take an existing network and fit a model using techniques from machine learning. For example, a the authors of [KJJ + 08] attempt to understand the Twitter network by fitting a stochastic model. However, while stochastic and learned models can explain on a macro level what is occurring in a network, on a micro level, i.e., looking ad individual nodes and its edges, they remain uninformative; the motivation as to why a node would maintain an edge is abstracted away. We instead consider game theoretic models of a network in which each node is a selfish agent and decided if and whom to connect to based on her utility.
Closely Related Models. There has been a lot of very interesting work surrounding game theoretic models for networks (see [Jac05] for a nice survey). Myerson was the first to consider such a model (see, e.g., [Mye77, AM88] ). However, formulated the problem as a cooperative game where agents worked together towards a common goal; in our setting we assume agents have individual, or selfish, goals.
A line of work that is similar in spirit to ours considers game theoretic models with selfish agents on undirected networks. [JW96] introduced a model for the study of the (static) stability of undirected networks. has discounted (based on path length) rewards for being connected to another agent, and cost for making a link. Their goal was to understand the relationship between stability and efficiency, which led to further results in this direction (see, e.g., [DM97, Jac03] ).
The authors of [Wat03] consider the same model in a dynamic (similar to our best-response edge dynamics, see Section 4.2). This model further studied by [JW02] and shows that the stochastic best response dynamics may converge to cycles; this is in contrast to our model which will always converge to an equilibrium. Directed networks allow one individual to connect to another without the consent of the second individual, and thus applications are to settings such as twitter following, while undirected network capture social networks where links are reciprocal, such as Facebook friendship. Thus, the two are fundamentally different in nature, hence it is not surprising that we reach significantly different conclusions.
The difference between directed and undirected graphs, however, is not just a technicality when it comes to modeling networks. In undirected networks, edges are implicitly reciprocal, hence consent is required from both endpoints; thus, undirected models are suitable for many forms of economic and social relationships. For directed networks, however, a vertex can link directly to another without reciprocally; thus, directed models are more suitable for capturing interactions that are passive in one direction, as with the consumption of public content. Not only are the applications and modeling considerations distinct, but they can lead to dramatic differences in the resulting graphs, their properties, and their efficiency.
The closest related work to our setting, by Bala and Goyal [BG00], studies the stability, efficiency, and dynamics of directed networks. In fact, our utility model can be viewed as a generalization of theirs. However, their approach differs significantly from ours; they use a lazy simultaneous update while we consider a asynchronous stochastic best-response dynamics. Due to the nature of their update, their process always converges to either a cycle or the empty network, while very complex structures can emerge from ours. 
DETECTING SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS
The primary goal of our experiments is to understand whether our model indeed helps charachterize social media networks. A clustering coefficient is a measure of the degree to which nodes in a graph tend to be highly interconnected in small clusters. While clustering is high in many real-word networks, evidence suggests social networks in particular are highly clustered [HL71, WS98] .
Inspired by our model, we define a generalized clustering coefficient. In order to do so, some definitions are in order.
We say an edge uv ∈ G is removable if UG−uv(u) > UG(u); such edges are effectively unstable (see Section 4.1 and Section 4.3). We let f (G, c, k, T ) ∈ [0, 1] be the percentage of removable edges in G for the model specified by c ∈ R+, k ∈ {2, 3, . . . , ∞}, and T : V → P(V ). We can define an analogous local version f (v, c, k, T (v)) ∈ [0, 1] as the percentage of removable edges going out from v. These functions implicitly define clustering coefficients as a function of our model parameters. In particular, we define two specific such clustering coefficients which we believe are of general interest.
Definition 3.1. The generalized (global) clustering coefficient of dimension k of a graph G to be the k-dimensional vector g where
Similarly, the generalized (local) clustering coefficient of dimension k of a vertex v to be the k-dimensional vector h where
For any c ≤ 1, an edge uv is removable if and only if there is a path of length at most k from u to v that does not use uv. Hence, the 1-dimensional generalized clustering coefficient makes a statement about the number of edges uv that participate in at least one closed triangle.
Remark 1. Our definition of clustering is closely related to the class of clustering coefficients which defined to be the percentage of (potential) triangles that are closed by an edge [WS98] . We instead measure the percentage of edges that close at least one triangle. Similarly, we can generalize the original definition to higher k: it would measure the percentage of (potential) cycles of length at most k that are closed, The example Facebook data set with 5 nodes and 7 unique circles. Each node appears twice in order to distinguish between its role as a circle owner (top row) and circle member (bottom row).
while we measure the percentage of edges completing at least one cycle of length at most k.
With some abuse of terminology, we colloquially say that G is more stable than G if gi(G) ≤ gi(G ) for all i. 
Data Sets
We considered three ego graphs from the snap datasets [LK14]: Facebook, Twitter and GooglePlus. The graphs are unweighted, and the Twitter and GooglePlus networks are directed. The Facebook network is undirected and we include both orientations of each edge in the graph.
The data sets were generated by taking a subset of ego nodes in a given network, adding all of their friends, and then looking at all edges between this set of nodes. An ego node v further came with information about her circles, i.e., subsets of Sv that form a social group and were found either by explicitly asking users to categorise their friends or by looking at existing lists on the given platform. Each ego node could have many circles, and circles may have nonempty intersections.
We use circles to define the target sets in one of our experiments; hence, we restrict the graph to only the ego nodes because the data set did not have circle information for nonego nodes. From this subset, we take the larges strongly connected component on which hot perform our experiments.
3 Alternative metrics (such as normalized versions of the generalized clustering coefficients) could also be of interest. Some details about the data can be seen in Table 1 .
There are three parameters for our experiment, namely the parameters of the model:
• c: the cost of maintaining an edge,
• k: the maximum distance,
• T (v): the target sets of the nodes.
Our main form of measurement is, for a given edge in G, whether it is removable. Recall that an edge uv ∈ G is removable if UG−uv(u) > UG(u); similarly, we say an edge is addable if uv ∈ G and UG+uv(u) ≤ UG(u) (see Figure fig: example for a small example illustrating these definitions). Recall that the percentage of removable edges is the ratio of the number of removable edges to the number of edges |E| and we define the percentage of addable edges by the ratio of the number of addable edges to the number of absent edges |V |(|V | − 1) − |E|.
An Example
Since the data set for Facebook, once sanitised as described above, was only 5 nodes, we simply use it here as an example to illustrate our definitions and give an example, on a small scale, of what the data looks like. Figure 3 depicts two copies of each node, {1, . . . , 5}, and the 7 corresponding unique circles {A, . . . , G}. An edge from the a top node v to a circle c denotes the fact that v has defined c, and an edge from c to a node u denotes the fact that u is contained in c. (a) We vary c from 1 to 20. T (v) = V . For short distances (k = 3) the percentage of Twitter edges that are removable are much less than GooglePlus, and even for arbitrarily long distance (k = ∞) the Twitter network is more stable. 
, so the % of removable edges must be monotonically increasing. Twitter has fewer removable edges than GooglePlus in all cases. In particular, all bottom nodes reachable from a given top node must be a subset of its neighbors.
In particular, note that every edge in the bottom triangle containing nodes 1, 2, and 3 is always removable for all ranges of c > 0. Indeed, such clustering is why we expect our model to have a high percentage of removable edges in a social network.
Indeed being able to distinguish between social networks and social media was the primary motivation for this work. Towards this end, we ask is the Twitter network more stable 4 than the GooglePlus network? In the remaining experiments we answer in the affirmative.
Experiments on c, k and T (v)
The definition of addable and removable edges directly depends on utility function (see Section 1.1),
Thus the main parameters we change in our experiments are c, k, and T (v). The experimental design for c and k is straightforward. For T (v) we consider three possibilities:
where C(v) are the vertices contained in v's circles according to our data set. The results are presented in Figure 5 .
Note that that the percentage of removable edges must be monotonically increasing in c, T and in k (when c ≤ 1).
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We observe that it is also monotonically increasing in k ≥ 2 when c > 1.
In all experiments, the percentage of removable edges in the 4 By stable we mean according to the generalized clustering coefficient (Definition 3.1) as discussed at the beginning of Section 3. 5 By monotonically increasing in T we mean that if T1 ⊇ T2, then the percentage of removable edges must be higher in T2 than in T1.
Twitter graph is lower than Google Plus.
6 This suggests less clustering at all distances, and an emphatic gap between social networks and social media.
We also consider the interplay between addable and removable edges; there is a natural tension between the two. Clearly, for k = ∞, since the graphs are strongly connected, all vertices are reachable, and hence no edge is addable. However, as discussed above, the number of removable edges will be at it's largest. Analogously, f orc ≤ 1, when the number of removable edges is at it's lowest with small k, the number of addable edges will be at it's highest since every edge to an unreachable vertex is addable. For c ≥ 1 the interplay is more complex, as observed in Figure 3 .2.
THEORETICAL RESULTS
Given that our model seems to capture key properties of social media networks, we now consider a formal analysis of our model; in particular our emphasis is on showing that a form of best response dynamics of this model will converge to a stable graph. Moreover, the class of stable graphs can be complex. We then charachterize classes of efficient graphs and further consider their stability. In this section we restrict to the setting where T (v) = V for all v ∈ V . We leave the theoretical understanding of these questions for different classes of T as a challenging open problem.
Preliminaries
The utilitarian objective welfare of a set of strategies is the collective utility of all of the agents; i.e., for the strategy set G, it is ϕ(G) = v UG(v). A network is efficient if it maximizes ϕ(G).
Denote by s−v by the (n − 1)-dimensional vector of the strategies played by all agents other than v. We will use the notation US v ,S −v (v) when it is convenient. A strategy vector S is said to be stable if for all agents v and each potential strategy S v ⊆ V , we have that
In other words, no agent v has any incentive to change her strategy from sv to s v , assuming that all other agents stick to their current strategies. Observe that such a solution is self-enforcing in the sense that once the agents are playing such a solution, no one has any incentive to deviate.
A strategy vector is symmetric if UG(v) = UG(u) for all u, v ∈ V , and is asymmetric otherwise. Hence, we also study symmetric-efficient networks (i.e., networks that maximize ϕ(G) amongst the set of symmetric networks), and symmetric-stable networks. Such networks allow for a notion of fairness since all agents have the same gain. Let S be the set of stable strategies and M be the set of symmetric strategies. Note that, a priori, these subsets need not have any correspondence. Moreover, efficient strategies may or may not be in either set.
A shorthand notation for the network obtained by adding (alternatively, deleting) the edge vw from an existing network G is G + vw (alternatively, G − vw). Similarly, we let G + Sv be the network obtained by adding all vu edges where u ∈ Sv to G.
Dynamics
We now consider possible a natural edge dynamics that allow for agents to update their strategies. We define the stochastic asynchronous best response edge dynamics to be such that, in each round, one directed pair of agents vw is selected at random.
7 If vw ∈ E and UG−vw(v) > UG(v) then vw is removed from E. Alternatively, if vw / ∈ E and UG+vw(v) ≥ UG(v), then vw is added to E.
Theorem 2. The edge dynamics for k = ∞ converge to a stable graph.
It is a priori not clear the any dynamics should converge, or that any interesting structure could emerge. In fact, the authors of [BG00] find that a discounted best response vertexdynamics must converge to either the cycle or the empty graph under the same conditions (k = ∞, T (v) = V ). On the other hand, as is evident in our proof, complex structures may emerge from the edge dynamics. The entire proof of convergence is rather technical and requires an in-depth case analysis. We present the full proof in Appendix B for completeness, but sketch the proof here in order to give some intuition.
Proof sketch of Theorem 2. We first note that in order to prove convergence, it suffices to show that for any initial graph G1, there exists a sequence of graphs G1, . . . Gs such that Gi and Gi+1 differ by at most a single edge that is either addable or removable in Gi, and Gs is stable. In other words, there is a path to convergence from any state which only uses addable or removable edges. If this path is finite, 7 We assume have a probability of being selected that is bounded away from 0 at every time step.
there is some (albeit tiny) probability, which is bounded away from 0, that this sequence of edges is selected. Hence, it suffices to construct such a sequence.
We first take G1 and recursively delete removable edges until no removable edge remains. We can then partition the graph into a set of strongly connected components C. The proof then proceeds by induction on certain structures in the graph; at each point we show that either we have reached a stable graph, or there exists an addable edge that makes progress. The technical difficulty arises in showing, once the edge has been added, that we can again recursively delete removable edges without reverting back to an earlier condition.
In order to do so, we must first carefully select which addable edge to introduce; indeed it is not difficult to show that the wrong choice of edge will either not make progress, or will cause a problem in the edge-removal stage. The technical difficulty in the proof arises from a detailed case analysis on the types of addable edges and proving that progress can be ensured in our selected sequence.
One important question that remains open is the time until convergence; in particular, we conjecture that the convergence time is fast. In effect, this is equivalent to showing that there are many short paths to convergence. Proving this, however, remains a challenging technical open problem.
Stability and Efficiency
We consider the question of whether stable networks exist 8 , and construct classes of efficient and stable networks. The main theorems and results are outlined in this section, and omitted proofs are presented in Appendix B.
We first observe some properties of the extremal ranges of the parameters.
Proposition 3. If c > 1 then the empty graph is stable. Moreover, if c > n−1 then the only stable graph is the empty graph.
Proposition 4. If k = 1 and c > 1 then the empty graph is efficient and is the only stable graph. If k = 1 and c < 1 then the complete graph is efficient and is the only stable graph. If k = 1 and c = 1 then all graphs are efficient and stable. Note that the empty graph is clearly symmetric since all agents have utility 0.
Hence, for the remainder of this section we only consider the ranges k > 1 and c ≤ n − 1. Indeed, for this range of parameters, we see more interesting networks emerge.
The first, called balanced flower graph, is defined for k ≤ 2 √ n and is constructed as follows: Make a directed cycle Figure 6 : A balanced flower graph with n = 26 vertices and k = 10. This is efficient and stable for c < 5.
of length k /2 + 1. Select one node from this set and call it the center. As long as at least k /2 nodes remain, select them, and, along with the center node, form another directed cycle. Repeat until fewer than k /2 nodes remain; then remove one non-central node from each petal (severing its edges and connecting its predecessor and successor) until you have k /2 − 1 nodes and form them into the final petal. We denote by q the number of petals. Note at most one node is removed from each petal in balancing since since k ≤ 2 √ n, and hence q ≥ k. Note that the balanced flower graph has diameter at most k. See Figure 6 for an example.
Theorem 4.1. For any 4 ≤ k ≤ 2 √ n and 3 ≤ n, the social welfare of the balanced flower graph (see Figure 6 ) is
Moreover, if 1 ≤ c < k /2 − 1 the balanced flower graph is efficient and stable.
Remark 5. In fact, for any 2 ≤ k, the (unbalanced) flower graph which leaves the last petal at it's size without rebalancing is also efficient; the constraint is due to the fact that for k > 2 √ n balancing as described above may not be possible. We could, instead, define a recursive balancing process that continues to steal vertices (possibly several from the same petal) until a balanced flower is reached for some k < k; efficiency follows directly, as does stability for a reduced c which is a function of n and k.
While the above graphs are efficient, they are highly asymmetric with a single node taking on most of the cost. Hence, we now turn our attention towards symmetric graphs, and consider a second class of graphs, known as Kautz graphs [EKT68, II83] (see Figure 7) .
The Kautz graph K In our case, we can rephrase the question as follows: Given a graph with n nodes and diameter k, what is the smallest possible number of edges m? Clearly, such a graph would maximize social welfare restricted to the set of strongly connected graphs; we can extend this result to all graphs.
Theorem 4.2. For any k ≥ 4, n ≥ 16, and c < n /log k (n) the Kautz graph K k−1 log k (n) (see Figure 7) is asymptotically symmetric-efficient 9 and its social welfare is
Moreover, for c ≤ 1 the Kautz graph is stable.
Remark 6. We leave open the question of whether Kautz graphs are stable for any c > 1, and more generally, the question of characterizing optimal symmetric stable graphs.
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper we introduce a new game theoretic network model and use it to inspire a new k-dimensional generalized clustering coefficient; prior to this work only 1-dimensional clustering coefficients existed. We empirically lend evidence towards the conjecture that this clustering coefficient can distinguish between social networks and social media networks for all k by looking at a subset of the Twitter graph and the GooglePlus graph. This work opens an interesting line of research which rigorously, with the use of larger data sets, establishes both the dichotomy between social and media networks and studies the properties of graphs with different generalized clustering coefficients. In particular, it would be interesting to consider a machine learning approach which can distinguish between different classes of graphs (including but not limited to social, media, biological, infrastructural and web) based only on their generalized clustering coefficient.
We show that for T (v) = V and k = ∞, a natural edge dynamics converge to a stable network; moreover these networks can be complex in structure. Our proof does not generalize to the case of k < ∞, and we leave open the question of whether these dynamics converge in that setting. Proving bounds on the time to convergence and understanding the regions of attraction for these dynamics would also be of interest as they inform the distribution of networks we would expect to see from a generative version of this model. For T (v) = V , we also give instances of efficient networks (for k √ n) and symmetric-efficient networks (for 4 ≤ k). While the former are stable for any c k /2, the latter are only stable for c ≤ 1; for the latter we rely on a long line of work from combinatorics, and determining whether any symmetric stable network exists appears to be a deep and technically challenging open problem. 
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APPENDIX A. BIDIRECTIONAL MODEL
We now introduce an extension of our model to bidirectional edges. Let G(V, Es, E ) be a graph where V is the set of vertices and Es, E are the set of directed speaking and listening edges respectively. Denote the speaking edge from v to w by svw and listening edge by vw , so svw ∈ Es indicates that v speaks to w in the network G and vw ∈ E indicates that v listen to w. We let ds + G (v) = |{w|svw ∈ Es}| denote the number of outgoing speaking edges of v, and let ds − G (v) = |{w|suw ∈ Es}| denote the number of incoming speaking edges to v. The analogous definition is used for listening in/out-degree.
We say there is an speaking path of length k from u to w if there exists a set of directed edges suv 1 , sv 1 v 2 , . . . , sv k w ∈ Es and wv k , v k v k−1 , . . . , v 2 v 1 ∈ E . We let RS k G (v) ⊆ V be the set of vertices that are speaking reachable from v via a speaking path starting at v of length at most k. The similar defenition used for listening pathe so we say that there is a listening path of length k from u to w if there exists a set of directed edges uv 1 , v 1 v 2 , . . . , v k w ∈ E and swv k , sv k v k−1 , . . . , sv 2 v 1 ∈ Es. We let RL k G (v) ⊆ V be the set of vertices that are listening reachable from v via a listening path starting at v of length at most k.
We let T (v) ⊆ V be the target set of node v, i.e., the set of nodes v would like to reach. We can then define the speaking and listening utility of a node v in a graph G as follows:
where cs (alternatively, c ) is the cost of maintaining an speaking (alternatively, listening) edge. The total utility of v is then given by
While we do not go into a thorough treatment of this model, we observe one important property: In any stable network, all edges are bidirectional. Hence, despite allowing unilateral actions, in stability agreement must emerge.
Proposition 7. For any stable network G and cs > 0, c l > 0, all speaking and listening edges are bidirectional; in other words svw ∈ Es ⇒ wv ∈ E , and vw ∈ E ⇒ swv ∈ Es.
Proof. We will prove the contrapositive. Assume that there exist vertices v, w ∈ V such that svw ∈ Es and wv / ∈ E . Since wv / ∈ E , if for any node z we have z ∈ RS k G (v), then, by the definition of reachability, there exists a path from v to z that does not use edge svw. Thus there is no node z such that z ∈ RS k G (v) and z ∈ RS Proof of Theorem 2. Recall from the proof sketch that it suffices to show a that for any G there exists a sequence of graphs G1, . . . , G k such that Gi and Gi+1 differ only by a single addable or removable edge and G k is stable.
Such a sequence is constructed as follows:
1. Recursively delete removable edges one at a time until no removable edge remains. 2. If there is no addable edge then we have reached a stable graph. 3. Otherwise, partition the graph into maximal strongly connected components; the component-level graph must be a directed acyclic graph (Lemma 10). We call a component a root if it has no incoming edge, and a leaf if it has no outgoing edge. It is often convenient for us to restrict to the components of size > c, which we call largecomponents; roots and leaves are then defined within the large-component graph. Note that there must be at least one large component, otherwise we contradict the fact that an edge is addable (Lemma 11) 4. For each root Ri of the large-component graph, designate a special vertex ri. Note that for any (large or small) component C such that Ri ⊆ RG(C), the edge xri is addable for any x ∈ C (Lemma 12); hence, the edges specified in steps 5-7 must be addable. 5. If some leaf Li = Ri exists in the large-component graph rooted at Ri, add the edge iri for some i ∈ Li and go back to step 1. 6. Otherwise, all large-components have no edges between them in the large-component graph. If there are more than one large components, let R1, R2 be any two largecomponents such that R1 ⊆ RG(R2). Add the edge r2r1. If R2 ⊆ RG+r 2 r 1 (R1), also add the edge r1r2. Go back to step 1. 7. Otherwise, there is exactly one large-component R1. If there exists a small component Sj that is a leaf, add the edge sjr1 for some sj ∈ Sj and go back to step 1. 8. Again, there is exactly one large-component R1, and this set R1 is reachable from every component (otherwise we would be in step 7). Moreover, there must be at least one small component S k that is a root and in which |RG(S k ) \ R1| > c (Lemma 16). Let t k r k be an edge that reaches R1 on a path from S k , i.e., r k ∈ R1 and t k ∈ R1, and t k ∈ RG(S k ). Add the edge r k s k for some s k ∈ S k and go back to step 1.
We prove in Lemma 9 that the only addable edges are between two different components; hence only inter-component edges must be addable; the above steps cover all possible types of addable edges in sequence until none remain.
After step 5+1 (alternatively 6+1), the number of large components that existed before step 5 (alternatively 6) is reduced by at least one (see Lemma 13 and Lemma 14 respectively). Hence, we will reach step 7 in finitely many rounds.
In step 7 there is exactly one large component (see also Lemma 11), and the number components without a direct edge to R1 is reduced by one. Moreover, after step 7 there are no removable edges, so the number of large components and the size of the largest component does not change in step 7+1 (Lemma 15). Thus, we never go back to steps 5 or 6, and after finitely many rounds, we will move on to step 8.
In step 8 again there is exactly one large component. In step 8+1 the the number of large components does not increase, thus, we never go back to step 5 or 6. While we may go back to step 7, however, every time we complete step 8 we have removed at least one edge from being addable at any point in the future (Lemma 8). Hence, we can remain in steps 7 and 8 for finitely many rounds, and the process will terminate in step 2.
lem 8. After step 8, we removed at least one edge from being addable at any point in the future. Moreover, the number of large components does not increase.
Proof. By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 13, we know that step 8 + 1 cannot increase the number of large components.
We prove that the edge r k s k cannot be added again in the future. Let R1 be the largest component in G (before step 8) and let R 1 be the largest component in G (after step 8+1). We reserve R 1 and G for an intermediary graphs.
It now suffices to argue that R 1 ∈ R G (s k ); hence either s k ∈ R 1 , or r k s k was removed in step 1 (after we added it in step 8), in which case |R G (s k ) \ R 1 | < c. Since steps 7 and 8 cannot increase R G (s k ) for any future G , the edge r k s k will never become addable again.
For sake of contradiction, assume R 1 ∈ R G (s k ). Let xy be the first removable edge such that R 1 ⊆ R G −xy (s k ); hence, xy must have been on every path from s k to R 1 , and in particular x ∈ R G (s k ) and R1 ⊆ R G −xy (x). However, |R1| > c, hence xy is not removable which gives a contradiction. lem 9. If vw is an addable edge in G, then v and w belong to different strongly connected components of G.
Proof. An edge vw is addable if UG+vw(v) > UG(v), in other words |RG+vw(v) − RG(v)| ≥ c. Assume that v and w belong to same strongly connected component. Thus RG(v) = RG(w), and hence RG+vw(v) = RG(v). Therefore the positive component of the utility for v does not increase, while the negative component would decrease. Hence no such vw edge is addable. lem 10. In step 3, the component-level graph is a directed acyclic graph.
Proof. Assume for sake of contradiction, that some set of two or more components form a cycle in the componentlevel graph. Then, for every x, y in the cycle, there must be some path from x to y as there is a path between any two vertices within every component, and a path between any two components via the cycle. Hence, the cycle in fact forms a strongly connected component contradicting the maximality of the partition. lem 11. Any leaf must either be an isolated vertex (with no parent) or is of size at least c; in particular a leaf that is not a root must be of size at least c. Moreover, in step 3, there exists a component of size at least c. In step 3, there exists some edge ab that is addable. From Lemma 9, we know that a and b must be in different components A, B. By assumption, we know that |B| < c, however, |RG(b) \ RG(a)| ≥ c. Thus, there must be at least one other component that is reachable from B. Thus, the component graph has at least one leaf, and, from above, that leaf must be of size at least c. Thus, there exists at least one component of size at least c. lem 12. In step 4, given any component C such that Ri ⊆ RG(C), for any x ∈ C the edge xri is addable.
Proof. Let Ri be a root of the large-component graph; trivially |Ri| ≥ c. If Ri is not reachable from a component C, then, for any x ∈ C we know |RG+xr i (x) \ RG(x)| ≥ |RG(ri) \ RG(x)| ≥ |Ri| ≥ c. Thus, xri is addable. lem 13. After adding an edge as in step 5 and then completing step 1, the number of large components at the beginning of step 5 has reduced by at least 1.
Proof. Clearly, adding edges cannot increase the number of components. Moreover, since Li is a leaf of Ri, and Li and Ri there is clearly a path from every ri ∈ Ri to every xi ∈ Li in the original graph. Using the new edge iri, there is now also a path from every xi ∈ Li to every ri ∈ Ri. Hence this reduces the number of large components by at least one.
Let G be the current graph (after adding iri, and removing an unknown number of edges). We must now show that, after deleting an edge, the number of large components has not increased.
Let xy be a removable edge in G and let X be the component that contains x. If y ∈ X, then removing xy does not increase the number of components of G . Assume y ∈ X. Let S be the set of vertices that are reachable from x only through xy. Thus, S ∩ X and X \ S will form two new strongly connected components after the removal of xy. Because xy is removable, we know that |R G −xy (x) \ R G (x)| < c. Note that we have exactly defined S = R G −xy (x) \ R G (x). Hence, |S ∩ X| ≤ |S| < c. Thus we have not increased the number of large connected components in G .
Thus, overall, the number of large components reduces by at least one. lem 14. After adding an edge as in step 6 and then completing step 1, the number of large components at the beginning of step 6 reduces by at least one.
Proof. Clearly, adding edges cannot increase the number of components. Moreover, after adding r2r1 (and if necessary r1r2), the two large components R1, R2 are in the same large component in the new graph. Hence, the number of large components has reduced by at least one.
By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 13, we see that after deleting edges, the number of large components does not increase, and hence, overall, the number of large components has reduced by at least one. lem 15. After adding an edge as in step 7 and then completing step 1, the number of large components at the beginning of step 7 does not increase and the number of components without a direct edge to R1 decreases by one.
Proof. Note that, at the beginning of step 7 there is a single large component (otherwise we would be in step 5 or 6). Clearly, adding the edge reduces the number of components without a direct edge to R1, and adding edges cannot increase the number of components or create more roots. We now show that no edge is removable when we go to step 1, everything that holds after step 7 must also hold after step 7+1.
Let G be the graph at the beginning of step 7. For sake of contradiction, assume that xy is a removable edge; thus, |RG+s j r 1 −xy (x) \ RG+s j r 1 (x)| < c. Since sjr1 was addable in G, we know that xy = sjr1. Additionally, since sj was an isolated vertex in G we know that it has no other edge and hence x = sj. Moreover, since sj was an isolated vertex in G, we know it has no incoming edge, and hence x ∈ RG+sjr 1 (z) for any z = x. Thus, RG+s j r 1 −xy (x) = RG−xy(x) and RG+s j r 1 (x) = RG(x), and this implies that |RG−xy(x) \ RG(x)| < c, and hence xy was removable in G. This gives a contradiction, as no such xy exists at the beginning of step 7 (as it would have been removed in the previous step 1).
lem 16. There is exactly one large-component R1, this set R1 is reachable from every component, and there must be at least one small component S k with no incoming edge such that |RG(S k ) \ R1| > c.
Proof. Exactly one large-component R1, since at least one large component exists (Lemma 11) and if two or more exists we would be in step 5 or 6. Moreover, R1 is reachable from every component, otherwise we would be in step 7. Lastly, we know that there must be some small component S k such that |RG(S k ) \ R1| > c, otherwise no edge addable. In particular, any rs k edge with r ∈ R1 and s k ∈ S k is addable.
B.2 Proofs from Section 4.3 (Stability and Efficiency)
